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I. Introduction
This Essay advances a simple thesis: Corporate governance
is best seen not as a subset of economics, or even law, but instead
a subset of moral psychology.
 Howard L. Oleck Professor of Business Law, School of Law, Wake
Forest University. I wish to thank Chris Bruner for inviting me to the Law
Review’s Symposium honoring Lyman Johnson and David Millon—even though
I am on the periphery of “progressive corporate law scholarship.” I wish to thank
Lyman and David for their friendship for so many years and for their
willingness (I am confident) to be “involuntary subjects” in this inquiry into
corporate moral matrices. I owe a special debt of gratitude to McNair Nichols
and Jenna Lorence, who teamed up to offer many thoughtful editorial
suggestions and track down citations to my sophomoric understanding of moral
psychology. Finally, I owe a special debt to Austin Thompson (’17) for his
research help and insightful comments on this foray outside the law into human
morality.
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Corporate governance—that is, the decision-making and
actions that arise from the dynamic relationship of investors and
management in corporations—is not the product of rational
economic incentives or prescriptive legal norms, but instead the
product of moral values. On questions of right and wrong in the
corporation, these moral values operate within the almost
unbounded discretion afforded to corporate investors (primarily
shareholders) and to corporate management (primarily directors
and officers). The many decisions that these corporate actors
make, like those of other human actors, are essentially emotive
and instinctive. The justifications offered by corporate actors for
their choices—whether resting on theories of shareholder
primacy, team production, board primacy, or even corporate
social responsibility—are after-the-fact rationalizations, not
reasoned thinking.
That is, those of us who seek to understand corporate
governance have largely been co-opted by the Western
philosophical belief in human rationality. Beginning with
Socrates and Plato, moving through Descartes and the
Enlightenment, and culminating in Law and Economics, we have
explained human decision-making as constructive thinking
leading to rational action. But recent research in the nascent area
of moral psychology suggests that we are not rational,
particularly when we operate in social and political groups.1 Our
decisions (moral judgments) arise in our subconscious, out of
rational view. This may be particularly so when we operate in the
super-organism that is the corporation, where our specialized
roles lead to almost unparalleled human cooperation.
While we have assumed that economic incentives and law
play a determinative role in shaping culture and thus the moral
matrix of our decision-making, it may be that things are the other
way around. Moral decisions arise not from reasoned responses to
human situations, but instead are driven by subconscious,
emotive, and irrational factors. We rationalize our moral
decisions—whether to feel compassion toward another who is
harmed, to desire freedom in the face of coercion, or to honor
1. See generally, Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology,
316 SCI. 998 (2007).
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those things we consider sacred—after we have made the
decision. We layer on a veneer of rationality, to reassure
ourselves of our own moral integrity and to signal our moral
values to others in our group who share our moral views. And we
choose our groups with great (subconscious) care.
Thus, the moral matrices—which in our political society have
become molded into progressive, conservative, and libertarian
camps—provide a powerful prism by which to understand
decisions in the corporate context. When presented with a
question of whether to move operations offshore, at the apparent
expense of local workers, what moral vectors guide (if not compel)
the board’s decision? When presented with a proposal that the
company report to shareholders on lobbying and political
expenditures, so as to make corporate managers more answerable
to shareholders with respect to corporate political activities, what
moral vectors guide shareholder votes? When faced with a
decision to leave fossil fuels in the ground or to extract their
immediate value, what guides the corporation’s temporal
horizon?
Although both directors and shareholders—indeed, all of
us—will offer a host of motivated reasoning—even a dizzying
plethora of after-the-fact rationalizations—for decisions on these
and other essentially moral business questions, the proffered
reasons should not be understood as the drivers. They are mere
echoes (sometimes distorted) of the moral forces that actually
drove the decision. For all meaningful corporate decisions, which
in the end are all laden with questions of right and wrong, moral
psychology teaches us that there is—almost certainly—
machinery that is deeper, nearly invisible, that motivates the
corporate actor’s decision.
My purpose in this Essay is twofold. First, I sketch the recent
research in the field of moral psychology that seeks to answer the
great philosophical question: When we make moral judgments,
are we rational or emotional? The emerging answer is at once
disturbing and liberating. We are emotional, analogical beings,
and what we say about our decisions—think, legal analysis—is
mostly a set of shadows on the wall. These studies reveal that we
are moved—in different proportions—by a sense of compassion,
fairness, freedom, loyalty, order, and sanctity. Lately, how we
hold these proportions has defined our political camps, with
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progressives moved by the moral vectors of caring and
fairness/equality; conservatives moved by these same moral
vectors, as well as those related to loyalty, order, and sanctity;
and libertarians moved especially by the moral vector of freedom.
Second, in the spirit of the symposium honoring the work of
David Millon and Lyman Johnson, I take a shot at applying these
insights to corporate governance—that is, to how moral decisions
happen in the corporation. I start by positing the story of a
corporate moral decision—specifically, whether a corporate board
should approve moving the company’s possibly unhealthy
manufacturing offshore. I then consider how the story implicates
the moral values identified by moral psychology: compassion,
fairness, freedom, loyalty, order, and sanctity. To do this, I
extract the moral vectors implicit in the recent writings on
corporate governance by David and Lyman—writings that state
(and thus reflect) how each of them approaches moral judgments
in the corporation. Their various arguments for greater pluralism
in the corporation, for a broader set of corporate duties, and even
for the sanctity of the corporation as an instrument of social
welfare reflect a set of “moral matrices.” In the end, it’s difficult
to predict how David and Lyman would each resolve the tough
choices facing a board of directors in a corporate offshoring
decision.
II. Moral Psychology
To better understand decisions within the corporation—and
thus corporate governance—it is useful to turn to the relatively
nascent field of moral psychology and the structures undergirding
moral judgments that research in this field has identified.2 Over
the past couple decades, studies and experiments have revealed
that our moral judgments and discourse arise from moral
matrices that mix and match at least six fundamental moral
2. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION, xii (2012) (“Politics and religion are both
expressions of our underlying moral psychology, and an understanding of that
psychology can help bring people together.”).
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values that can be expressed as opposites, each along a separate
axis:3
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

care / harm
fairness / cheating
liberty / oppression
loyalty / betrayal
authority / subversion
sanctity / degradation

According to these studies, we make moral judgments by
weighting these values in different ways—often in ways that are
closely aligned with our identification with different political
groups.4 In this country, political liberals are moved almost
exclusively by the values of caring/compassion and
fairness/equality, with adherents feeling strong (even visceral)
reactions against narratives of harm and inequality.5 Meanwhile,
political conservatives are moved by the additional values of
sanctity, authority/order, and loyalty, with adherents
experiencing strong reactions against narratives involving
desecration, disrespect, and disloyalty.6 And political libertarians
are moved primarily by the value of liberty/freedom, with strong

3. See Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek, Liberals and
Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1029–46 (2009) (finding that conservatives tended to value
five matrix values while liberals tended to prefer care and fairness over loyalty,
sanctity, and authority).
4. See id. at 1031 (“[W]e found that liberals showed evidence of a morality
based primarily on the individualizing foundations (Harm/care and
Fairness/reciprocity), whereas conservatives showed a more even distribution of
values, virtues, and concerns, including the two individualizing foundations and
the three binding foundations (Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and
Purity/sanctity).”).
5. See id. at 1040 (explaining that liberals are primarily moved by harm
and fairness concerns); HAIDT, supra note 2, at 295 (“The left builds its moral
matrix . . . most firmly and consistently on the Care foundation.”).
6. See Graham et al., supra note 3, at 1040 (explaining that conservative
moral concerns are more evenly distributed across harm, fairness, loyalty,
authority, and sanctity); HAIDT, supra note 2, at 306 (“[W]e have found that
social conservatives have the broadest set of moral concerns, valuing all six
foundations relatively equally . . . [with] relatively high settings on the Loyalty,
Authority, and Sanctity foundations . . . .”).
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reactions against government (or other) restrictions on individual
freedom and free markets.7
The following schematics from Haidt’s The Righteous Mind8
identify the different weights these moral values hold for
American liberals, conservatives and libertarians:
Fig. 1

Further, as each group self-reinforces its own value matrix,
the group’s views are purified and harden as they “bind” and then
become “blind” to the other.9 Thus, each political camp—which for
the past fifty years has become more compartmentalized and
purer—is built upon a set of heuristics that constitute the camp’s

7. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 300 (“Libertarians are the direct
descendants of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Enlightenment
reformers who fought to free people and markets from the control of kings and
clergy. Libertarians love liberty; that is their sacred value.”).
8. See id. at 297 fig.12.2, 302 fig.12.3, 306 fig.12.4 (depicting the weight of
moral values that groups of Americans with differing ideologies possess).
9. See id. at 313 (“Morality binds and blinds. It binds us into ideological
teams . . . . It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed of good
people . . . .”).
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moral matrix.10 For progressives, the defining account is
“oppressed versus protected,” using narratives that value
compassion and fairness in a struggle against hatred and
inequality.11 For conservatives, the defining account is
“traditional versus radical,” built on narratives that value
ordered authority built on deeply-held (often religious) views.12
For libertarians, the defining account is “free markets versus
regulatory intervention,” using narratives of individual and
collective liberty struggling against the tyranny of regulatory
(public and private) intrusion and coercion.13
Using different narratives, moral psychologists have gauged
the moral responses and attitudes held by adherents to each
group.14 Thus, members of different groups react strongly and
differently to moral narratives:15

10. See id. at 318 (“We are deeply intuitive creatures whose gut feelings
drive our strategic reasoning. This makes it difficult—but not impossible—to
connect with those who live in other matrices, which are often built on different
configurations of the available moral foundations.”).
11. See id. at 283–85 (describing the prototypical liberal narrative which
hinges on overcoming oppression and achieving fairness and equality).
12. See id. at 285–86 (describing the prototypical conservative narrative
which focuses on preservation of traditional values).
13. See id. at 300–02 (describing libertarian preference for free markets
and liberty and suspicion of government intervention).
14. See id. at 301 (“[W]e analyzed dozens of surveys completed by 12,000
libertarians and we compared their responses to those of tens of thousands of
liberals and conservatives.”).
15. Haidt has described the libertarian “moral matrix” as follows:
We found that libertarians look more like liberals than like
conservatives on most measures of personality (for example, both
groups score higher than conservatives on openness to experience,
and lower than conservatives on disgust sensitivity and
conscientiousness). On the Moral Foundations Questionnaire,
libertarians join liberals in scoring very low on the Loyalty,
Authority, and Sanctity foundations. Where they diverge from
liberals most sharply is on two measures: the Care foundation, where
they score very low (even lower than conservatives), and on some new
questions we added about economic liberty, where they scored
extremely high (a little higher than conservatives, a lot higher than
liberals).
Id.
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Fig. 2
Political group
Progressive
Conservative

Libertarian

Narrative
“A man walks down a sidewalk
and kicks a dog sleeping on the
side of the sidewalk.”
“A woman finds an old
American flag in her attic and
cuts it into rags to clean the
toilet.”
“A parent, whose gambling
hurts their family, is jailed for
being a compulsive gambler.”

Values
Caring, fairness
Loyalty,
authority,
sanctity
Liberty

The studies on how people react to these and similar stories
reveal that our moral views are mostly emotive, even
instinctual.16 Human decision-making appears to arise from two
cognitive systems: System One is quick and intuitive, and System
Two is slow and considered.17 Recent studies indicate that our
moral positions arise through System One and then are explained
and defended by System Two, which seems to engage in
“motivated reasoning” (think of a zealous, close-minded defense
lawyer) rather than “constructive reasoning” (think of an
objective, fair-minded judge).18
16. Daniel Kahneman offers a quite plausible account of how we reach
decisions, moral and otherwise:
The spontaneous search for an intuitive solution sometimes fails—
neither an expert solution nor a heuristic answer comes to mind. In
such cases we often find ourselves switching to a slower, more
deliberate and effortful form of thinking. This is the slow thinking of
the title. Fast thinking includes both variants of intuitive thought—
the expert and the heuristic—as well as the entirely automatic
mental activities of perception and memory, the operations that
enable you to know there is a lamp on your desk or retrieve the name
of the capital of Russia.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 13 (2012).
17. See id. at 20–21 (describing Systems One and Two—the dual systems
by which humans make snap judgments and calculated decisions).
18. See id. at 21 (“The automatic operations of System 1 generate
surprisingly complex patterns of ideas, but only the slower System 2 can
construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps.”).
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That is, our explanations (rationalizations) come only after
arriving at a moral conclusion about a given moral situation.
Thus, these studies address and answer the age-old question of
whether we are essentially rational beings who sometimes must
tame our emotions, or whether we are emotional beings who use
reason to justify our actions and beliefs.19 The resounding answer
from the studies is that we are emotional beings who come to
moral views based on a moral matrix that we are often unaware
of and that we often take from the moral group to which we are
aligned.20 And only after coming to a moral conclusion do we then
rationalize our view by resorting to the language sets provided by
the group, drawing from its fundamental moral values.
The studies also suggest that value matrices tend to harden
into psychological attitudes.21 For example, conservatives tend to
like order and predictability (both attributes of tradition and
authority), while liberals tend to like variety and diversity (both
attributes of tolerance and liberty).22 Thus, when shown dots
moving on a screen, conservatives prefer the images of dots
moving in lock step, while liberals prefer random motion.23
In addition, liberals tend to be universalists who view people
everywhere in the world as relevant to their moral equation,
while conservatives are more focused on people in their country
or their self-defined communities. Therefore, political policies
aimed to improve the lives of people generally in the world
resonate with liberals, while those same policies presented to
conservatives have less salience and suggest disloyalty to one’s
own.

19. See id. at 89 (“[B]asic assessments play an important role in intuitive
judgment, because they are easily substituted for more difficult questions—this
is the essential idea of the heuristics and biases approach.”).
20. See id. at 313 (discussing the impact of a “moral matrix”).
21. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 368 (“Our minds contain a toolbox of
psychological systems, including the six moral foundations, which can be used to
meet those challenges and construct effective moral communities.”).
22. See id. at 300–06 (discussing liberal and conservative ideals).
23. See Jonathan Haidt: The Psychology Behind Morality, ON BEING WITH
KRISTA TIPPETT (June 12, 2014), https://www.onbeing.org/programs/jonathanhaidt-the-psychology-behind-morality/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (describing the
study in an interview) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Likewise, the studies suggest liberals are more open to new
experiences, while conservatives have trouble assimilating the
unknown.24 That is, liberals exhibit the trait of being willing to
accept and accommodate to change, while conservatives are
skeptical of change and prefer the predictability of tradition.
In short, it turns out that the abiding faith in human
rationality as the basis to moral judgments—from Socrates and
Plato, to Descartes and the Enlightenment, to the Rule of Law
and even Law and Economics—may be wrong. The notion that we
decide moral questions of right/wrong (most everything) through
rational processes is mostly hogwash.
III. The Moral Matrices of David Millon and Lyman Johnson
Moral psychology thus suggests that, though we each carry
and make moral decisions based on our own moral matrix, our
moral judgments are formed by moral values shared and refined
by our tribal groups.25 The natural question for those interested
in corporate governance seems obvious: How does moral
psychology play out in the boardroom?
If this were a law Article, I would attempt a study using the
tools of moral psychology to assess how actual corporate decisions
are made—a highly useful, but daunting task.26 But because this
24. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 300–06 (analyzing liberal and conservative
values).
25. As Haidt points out:
We humans have a dual nature—we are selfish primates who long to
be part of something larger and nobler than ourselves. We are 90
percent chimp and 10 percent bee. If you take that claim
metaphorically, then the groupish and hivish things that people do
will make a lot more sense. It’s almost as though there’s a switch in
our heads that activates our hivish potential when conditions are just
right.
Id. at 255.
26. In fact, the “paper” I presented at the Symposium on October 21, 2016,
included the preliminary results of my research on boardroom attention to
sustainability and other environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters. I
found a small, but perceptible, increase in corporate ESG focus—findings that
are in line with studies cited by Millon and Johnson. See, e.g., Millon, infra note
32, at 26–28 (describing greater attention to ESG factors by “mainstream
institutional shareholders”).

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 1129
is an Essay for a law Symposium celebrating David Millon and
Lyman Johnson, I will assume the latitude to attempt a profile of
their corporate moral matrices. As self-proclaimed “progressive
corporate legal scholars,”27 they would seem to be appropriate
subjects for this first ever speculation on how moral values might
play out in corporate decisions. I do this—applying not the
methods of moral psychology, but rather the methods of legal
textual analysis—by attempting to reconstruct their corporate
governance views along the six identified moral values of modern
moral psychology.28
A moral story. I begin my inquiry into the moral matrices of
Millon and Johnson, as reflected in their recent writings on
corporate governance, by framing a moral story as an instrument
to tease out the moral matrix for each of them. Here is the story:
Management of a large multinational corporation
recommends to the company’s board of directors that the board
approve a move of the company’s manufacturing facilities from
Looking at the 10-K annual reports by companies in the S&P 100, I found
that, while only fifty-seven companies in 2015 mentioned sustainability or
climate change as relevant to their business, this was up from forty-one
companies in 2010. Corporate disclosures on average moved from “mere
mention” of these matters in 2010 to “some discussion” in 2015. The picture is
similar in annual SEC-filed proxy statements, where thirty-one companies in
2015 disclosed that their boards or board committees have responsibility to
consider ESG matters (many with a new standing committee charged with the
task), up from nineteen in 2010. A similarly small but upward trend also
appears in the linkage between executive pay and ESG performance measures.
While in 2010 only four of S&P 100 had this link, the number grew to eight in
2015, with sustainable, responsible, impact (SRI) performance moving in these
companies from a “mere mention” to a “factor” in setting executive pay.
These ESG trends reflected in corporate disclosures and apparent
boardroom attention are encouraging. Extrapolating from the 2010–2015 trends,
I estimated that by 2024 all S&P 100 companies will be disclosing the relevance
of ESG to their business, by 2027 all will have board committees focused on
ESG, and by 2033 all will link executive pay to ESG performance. At the current
pace, it will not be until 2070 that all of the S&P 100 will have adopted ESG as
a core business purpose.
27. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Hobby
Lobby] (arguing that the Court is correct in finding that business corporations
should not limit themselves solely to the pursuit of profit).
28. See infra Parts III.A–F (examining the corporate perspectives of Lyman
Johnson and David Millon on a number of topics).

1130

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1119 (2017)

the United States to Ruranesia. Management has learned of
preliminary medical studies suggesting that a chemical used in
the company’s manufacturing process is a carcinogen. To avoid
potential trouble with OSHA and liability to exposed workers,
management says that the company can take advantage of the
more lax workplace standards of Ruranesia. Manufacturing costs
will also be lower in Ruranesia. The directors approve the move,
citing corporate profits as their reason.
How would David and Lyman respond to this moral story? Of
course, we do not really know what would be their instinctive,
emotive response. And the interesting thing is that they would
not be able to predict it either, given that our moral judgments
emanate from the bowels of our unplumbed subconscious.29
But bear with me. Let me speculate what would be David’s
and Lyman’s moral response to this story. It is, after all, a
“corporate governance” story of a board of directors that chooses
to have the company engage in an off-shoring, legal-arbitrage
strategy. It thus pits the interests of a variety of corporate
constituents, some highlighted in the story and others lurking in
the shadows. As law scholars concerned about the question of the
“purpose” of the corporation and “to whom” corporate fiduciaries
should answer,30 the story is right up their alley.
I undertake my speculation—itself, of course, a moral
judgment—by looking at three recent Articles by David and by
Lyman that consider their different perspectives on corporate
governance, in the process revealing a bit about the motivated
reasoning each of them has employed to explain their stances on
corporate governance. And, as interested as I am in how David
and Lyman might respond to the story that I posit, I also use this
exercise to discern my own moral matrix and how I respond to
the story. In fact, maybe the value of the exercise is not really
about David or Lyman—or even about me. Instead, it is a call to
each of you who has plodded through to this point to think of your
29. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 16, at 4 (“The mental work that produces
impressions, intuitions, and many decisions goes on in silence in our mind.”).
30. See generally, e.g., Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of
Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787 (1999); David K. Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law].
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own moral matrix—the corporate governance story providing us a
shared Rorsharch test.
My sampled Articles. Here are the Articles that I consider:
David Millon’s Articles:
 Radical Shareholder Primacy (2013)31
 Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the
Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law (2012)32
 Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility (2011)33
Lyman Johnson’s Articles:
 Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate
Governance (2013)34
 Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment
Rule, Corporate Purpose (2013)35
 Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties (2011)36

In re-reading these writings, I am struck by the many
differences (sometimes obvious and sometimes subtle) between
David’s and Lyman’s moral approaches.
To me, David has the heart of a true progressive; his writings
reveal great care and concern for fair treatment of those affected
by the modern corporation.37 At the same time, his moral matrix
also seems to lead him to consider whether some of these
31. David K. Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
1013 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Shareholder Primacy].
32. David K. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility,
and the Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Millon, Enlightened Shareholder].
33. David K. Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011) [hereinafter Millon, Two Models of CSR].
34. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson,
Law and Corporate Responsibility].
35. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law:
Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013)
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness].
36. Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV.
701 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties].
37. See generally Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon,
Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note
33.
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progressive goals might not be accomplished through an
enlightened corporate freedom in which managers respond to
market and reputational pressures, thus “to pay attention to
human rights and environmental norms of good behavior.”38 But
he has doubts that market-driven freedom—given informational
limitations, the tendencies of corporate management to cheat,
and the corporation’s profit-driven motivations—will be sufficient
to move corporations to “go as [corporate social responsibility
(CSR)] advocates might they think should.”39 That is, he
questions the loyalty that corporate managers feel toward the
financial bottom line, rejects their obedience to a narrowlydefined profit imperative, and especially disdains their sense that
the profit motive and our capitalism are sacred.40 Thus, in the
name of caring and fairness, David disavows fundamental
libertarian/conservative tenets.41 He may well define the
corporate progressive!
Lyman, on the other hand, comes across to me to be more
multi-dimensional. Although he has joined David on joint projects
seeking to minimize the oppressive power of corporate
managers,42 Lyman seems to have a clearer vision of the
corporation as a moral institution.43 He attaches importance to
(enforceable) loyalty, built on deep, unstated assumptions of trust
by those who give their lives and souls (and perhaps money) to
the corporate enterprise.44 He imagines fiduciary duties, it seems,
38. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 45.
39. Id. at 46.
40. See id. (“Ultimately, corporate management is and will continue to be
driven by cost-benefit concerns, which means that certain problems will not be
addressed or prevented if it is not cost-effective to do so.”).
41. See id. (arguing that there is a responsibility gap in the way corporate
management adheres to cost-benefit concerns in dealing with certain problems).
42. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, Hobby Lobby, supra note 27, at 14 (arguing
that “constituency statutes” empower corporate management to consider
non-shareholder interests in directing the corporation’s business).
43. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (discussing Lyman
Johnson’s vision of the corporation).
44. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975
(“Recently, corporate law’s long and unsustainable neglect of corporate
responsibility concerns has led to the emergence of a new type of business
corporation, the benefit corporation.” (internal citations omitted)).
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as a sort of credo for our life in modern business.45 He grounds
many of his arguments in historic analysis and constitutional
frameworks, thus revealing the importance he attaches to
structure and tradition. He also is much clearer in seeing sanctity
in the human ties that bind us together in the super-organism
that is the corporation, just as bees assiduously work in various
ways to make their hive succeed.46 That is, while David may
sense the sacred in our natural environment, Lyman seems to
sense it in the corporation, a paradigmatic collaborative human
enterprise. In the end, Lyman may well be a model corporate
conservative!
Next I consider how David and Lyman reflect, in different
ways and to different extents, the moral values (and opposites)
identified by moral psychology as relevant to our moral decisionmaking.
A. Caring/Harm
Both David Millon and Lyman Johnson—reflecting perhaps
the defining trait of progressive corporate law scholars—would
have corporate decision makers “care” more about how their
decisions affect non-shareholders.47 They both proclaim their goal
of advancing the cause of corporate pluralism—the caring by
corporate decision makers about a broad spectrum of corporate
stakeholders.48 They both decry others whose views on corporate
governance focus on short-term shareholder profits without
explicit consideration of (caring for) non-investor constituencies.49
45. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 702 (noting that
he believes “wholesale waiver of fiduciary duties is objectionable and bad
policy”).
46. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982
(showing disdain that the federal incursion into corporate governance focuses
almost exclusively on stockholder interests).
47. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing David
Millon’s and Lyman Johnson’s views of the corporation).
48. See generally Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note
34; Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 33.
49. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 989
(denouncing Professor Lucian Bebchuk for arguing for investor activism without
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David questions the “radical” version of shareholder primacy,
in which the only objective of the corporation is shareholder
wealth maximization—with corporate managers serving as
agents for a homogeneous body of profit-seeking equity
investors.50 Instead, David calls for “enlightened shareholder
value” in which shareholder wealth is understood as “a long-run
orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based on
responsible attention to the full range of relevant stakeholder
interests.”51 David’s accounts are inevitably sprinkled with
“caring” stories of how non-shareholders have suffered at the
hands of heartless, profit-oriented managers—such as the 1984
Bhopal disaster, Shell Oil’s activities in the Niger delta, or Nike’s
use of child labor.52
Lyman, while espousing what he refers to as “institutional
pluralism,” as distinguished from the “undesirable monism” of
shareholder wealth maximization,53 engages much more in the
language of responsibility.54 In fact, his writings do not focus on
the specific people for whom corporate governance should be
concerned.55 For example, the three Articles that I sampled make
considering “the effects on noninvestor constituencies”); Millon, Enlightened
Shareholder, supra note 33, at 1 (criticizing short-term focus on current share
price without considering immediate or longer-term negative effects on
non-shareholders).
50. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1014 (“[P]roponents
of radical shareholder primacy . . . all accept the agency characterization and
the shareholder wealth maximization injunction.”).
51. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 1.
52. See id. at 22–23, 28 (discussing the Bhopal disaster of 1984, Royal
Dutch Shell PLC’s and its Nigerian subsidiary’s involvement in torture and
execution, and Nike’s 1992 adoption of a code of conduct that “mandates
observance of basic labor, health, and safety standards”); see also Millon, Two
Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 531 (describing Nestle’s entry into milk
production in the Moga district of India).
53. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 409–10 (arguing that
“[w]ithout a statutory ‘fix,’ or timely clarification by the Delaware Supreme
Court, Delaware law might be interpreted as imposing an undesirable monism
of corporate purpose at a time when, in corporate law elsewhere, institutional
pluralism should be encouraged”).
54. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975
(decrying neglect of “corporate responsibility concerns”).
55. See generally id.; Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson,
Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36.
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no specific mention of workers, employees, or communities—even
as he urges that the corporation’s purpose be more pluralistic and
responsible.56 Perhaps a bit like Charlie Brown’s Linus, Lyman
may have stronger feelings for mankind than he does for
individual people.57 But this may also be a sign of his being a true
conservative—that is, one who recognizes that empathy
(identifying with another person, as opposed to feeling
compassion for that person) may lead our emotions astray and
become a misguided basis for making good policy.58 To Lyman,
institutions would seem to be more important than individuals.
So how would David and Lyman respond to my offshoring
story, at least as it suggests possible harm to workers both in the
United States and in Ruranesia? David would no doubt call for
this harm to be factored into the board’s decision, because of the
potential costs to the company, but also because of pluralistic
caring that should be woven into all corporate decision-making.59
Lyman might be less moved by the plight of the workers, possibly
noticing that it is unclear whether the U.S. workers would prefer
to keep their jobs in the face of the potential health risks, and
whether the Ruranesia workers might be delighted to accept the
risks in exchange for the new employment.60
Perhaps not surprisingly, absent from David’s and Lyman’s
thinking on the pluralistic corporation is any sense of compassion
for the shareholders whose financial destinies are in the hands of
corporate managers.61 David reduces these shareholders to
56. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 13, at 978
(mentioning workers only once in quoted passage describing Germany’s dual
board system).
57. See Charles Schulz, Peanuts, GOCOMICS, http://www.gocomics.
com/peanuts/1959/11/12/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (depicting Charlie Brown’s
love for mankind) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See Paul Bloom, Perils of Empathy, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 2, 2016, 9:38
AM), www.wsj.com/articles/the-perils-of-empathy-1480689513 (last visited Apr.
18, 2017) (arguing that “when it comes to guiding our decisions, empathy is a
moral train wreck” and effectively “makes the world worse”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See supra notes 50–52 (deriving David Millon’s take on corporate
governance from his works).
60. See supra notes 53–58 (extracting Lyman Johnson’s thoughts on
corporate governance from his works).
61. See generally, e.g., Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon,
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“short-term institutional investors” that pressure managers in
untoward ways to exploit non-shareholders for their short-term
purposes.62 Lyman is not as derisive and recognizes that
investors have been harmed by corporate misconduct, but he also
seems to view shareholders as somehow less deserving of our
compassion compared to non-shareholder constituencies.63
This reduction of shareholders to money-grubbing capitalists
is natural in moral framing.64 Thus, neither David nor Lyman, in
commenting on the modern corporate structure, gives attention to
the individual retirees and savers looking for financial returns for
their under-funded pensions, their poor-performing individual
retirement accounts, or their skimpy college savings plans.65
Thus, the moral forces pitted against each other in the offshoring
decision would not seem to include—in David’s moral weighting
and only slightly in Lyman’s—the investors whose savings
constitute the holdings of institutional intermediaries against
whom they aim their moral indignation or skepticism. These
savers, who it would seem David and Lyman seem to disentitle as
owners, must share the corporate enterprise with other nonowners.

Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note
33; Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34; Johnson,
Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36.
62. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 4 (“Shareholder
pressures for short-term results and compensation packages that reward
management for delivering them will presumably continue to encourage a
myopic outlook.”).
63. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982–
86 (describing pro-shareholder activism as favoring shareholders, not other
corporate constituents, though recognizing that the financial scandals of the
early 2000s “greatly harmed investors”).
64. See Sanjay Sanghoee, Why Shareholder Value Should Not Be the Only
Goal of Public Companies, TIME, Feb. 4, 2014, http://time.com/4121/whyshareholder-value-should-not-be-the-only-goal-of-public-companies/ (last visited
Apr. 18, 2017) (noting that “[i]t is widely accepted that companies should have
only one goal, which is to maximize returns for investors”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See generally, e.g., Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon,
Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note
33; Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34; Johnson,
Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36.
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That is, neither David nor Lyman would seem to be moved by
the subtext of my offshoring story that shareholders (who do not
appear explicitly in the story) would be better off if the company
sought to cut its costs and liability risks by moving its
manufacturing offshore. Nor would it seem relevant that there
might be a confluence of interests: Shareholders are happy that
the offshoring decision will reduce the company’s costs and risks;
the workers in the United States (and perhaps even more their
families) are happy not to be exposed to a (possible) carcinogen;
and the Ruranesia workers (though perhaps less their families)
are happy for the new employment, whatever the health risks.
Perhaps Lyman might have been more circumspect, given his
view that the pluralistic corporation is measured by a process
where “public interest” directors consider the interests of the
various stakeholders.66 But who are the stakeholders here, and
what are their interests? Are they the U.S. workers left jobless,
but saved from exposure to a possible carcinogen, or are they the
Ruranesia workers now employed, but at risk of poor health and
an earlier death? Or, perhaps more broadly, are the stakeholders
the U.S. communities, now with higher unemployment though
perhaps fewer health costs, or are they the Ruranesia
communities, now with higher employment but with higher (or
lower) health costs?67
In short, we may not know the strength or direction of the
“caring” moral vector that both David and Lyman, in different
66. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 977–
79 (summarizing proposals to install “public interest directors” on corporate
boards to advance the welfare of non-shareholder stakeholders, such as
employees, consumers, and communities).
67. There is also the possibility that communities are served by certain
virulent cancers, particularly if they strike workers near their retirement age.
Perhaps a virulent, fast-acting cancer resulting in lower healthcare costs
reduces protracted elder-care costs. How should directors weigh such a scenario?
How would workers in Ruranesia, where life might generally be “poor, nasty,
brutish, and short,” view the scenario? See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (“And the life of man,
solitary, poore, brutish, and short.”) (describing the consequences of living
without security, akin to wartime). Ruranesia may also be one of those countries
with pluterperfect happiness and the value of life should be weighed more
highly than life in the United States, particularly before America was made
great again.
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ways, seem to embrace. Even if we identify that corporate
governance should ask decision-makers to care about a broader
set of concerns than financial returns for shareholders, a
CSR-infused corporate governance does not answer the question:
For whom should the enlightened corporate managers act?
David’s references to stories from outside the United States
would suggest his instincts might side with the Ruranesia
workers,68 while Lyman’s seeming attention to those who act and
live “within the corporation,” though not fully recognized by law,
would suggest his instincts would be for the United States
workers.69 But we do not know.
B. Fairness (Equal or Proportional)/Cheating
David and Lyman differ in their views on the question of the
appropriate place of non-shareholder constituents in the
corporation.70 David seems to accept, at least in advancing his
thesis of “enlightened shareholder value,” that shareholders have
some sort of “priority” in the corporate hierarchy.71 He does not
urge, at least in making this argument, a pluralistic model in
which shareholders and other stakeholders have comparable
claims on corporate outcomes. Lyman, however, writes in terms
of a pluralism of interests, in which non-shareholder constituents
should have claims comparable to those of shareholders.72 Thus,
for Lyman fairness is about equality, while David seems to accept

68. See, e.g., Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 531 (discussing
Norwegian company Yara International’s ASA sponsorship of partnerships to
“develop storage, transportation, and port facilities that will serve African
regions”).
69. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 974–
75 (tracing the history of corporate responsibility).
70. See infra notes 72–84 (discussing David Millon’s and Lyman Johnson’s
views on non-shareholder constituents).
71. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 1 (“ESV still
recognizes the priority of shareholder interests and therefore differs from a
pluralist management model based on balancing of all stakeholder interests.”).
72. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 410 (arguing that
institutional pluralism should be encouraged).
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the possibility that fairness may be proportional to some
entitlement, including based on capital contributions.73
In presenting his thesis of enlightened shareholder value,
David seems to understand fairness in the corporation as arising
when corporate managers take into account non-shareholder
interests, but only to the extent they are weighted with respect to
long-term shareholder interests.74 In this way, David hews more
closely to traditional doctrine and practice that assumes a
corporate pecking order.75 Lyman, however, seems to understand
fairness in the corporation as arising when non-shareholder
interests are given equal weighting with shareholder interests.76
Lyman is much more a communitarian, urging the recognition of
non-shareholder claims that go well beyond traditional doctrine
and practice.
In addition, David and Lyman see the motives for
consideration of non-shareholder interests as emanating from
different sources. For David, a broader management perspective
in both a “longitudinal” (temporal) dimension and a “latitudinal”
(range of interests) dimension may arise from growing
shareholder and other market pressures to consider interests
beyond short-term shareholder financial results.77 For Lyman, a
more ecumenical management perspective may not be supported
by current judicial doctrine and thus would require a legislative
73. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3 (explaining
that the ESV approach is an alternative to both a shareholder primacy approach
and a pluralist approach).
74. See id. at 7 (“[M]anagement must attend to the full range of
considerations that determine its well-being.”).
75. See id. at 2 (arguing that U.S. corporate law provides “ample space for
express recognition of nonshareholder interests and long-run approach to
management”).
76. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 445 (embracing the idea
that pursuit of common-good is achieved when considered at the institutional
and individual level).
77. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 536 (identifying a
“sustainable model of CSR” as recognition that corporation’s long-run prosperity
depends on the well-being of various stakeholders); see also Millon, Enlightened
Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3–4 (identifying emerging attitudes of
institutional shareholders toward socially-responsible investing and pressures
from public opinion, moved by non-governmental organizations and the media,
to consider longer-term labor and environmental impacts).
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solution, one beyond that offered by the fledgling “benefit
corporation.”78
Lyman disparages the argument that shareholders have a
legal entitlement or deserve a priority in the corporate
hierarchy.79 He heaps scorn on the Law and Economics
movement, decrying its “steely focus on investor well-being via
hostile takeovers” and its disaggregation of “the corporate
institution into a mere ‘nexus’ of various contracting parties in
which investor interests were paramount.”80 David joins in,
criticizing the nexus-of-contracts theory for its conceiving of the
corporation as a “legal fiction” and thus discounting the
“possibility that management might owe duties to the corporate
entity rather than simply to shareholders.”81 But David seems
less willing to abandon the corporation’s capitalist underpinnings
and to take up a communitarian vision of the corporation.
Shareholders, in David’s view, are entitled to get something for
their investment.82
Lyman, however, rejects the libertarian justification for
shareholder
primacy—that
shareholders,
unlike
other
constituents, have paid for their vaunted status. Lyman
celebrates the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in the
Time-Warner83 case that “emphasized that corporate directors
were legally responsible for directing the ‘corporation’s’ best
interests and that such company interests were not necessarily
the same as those of investors seeking a near-term premium for

78. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 990
(calling for revision of corporate statutes to reflect both the discretion and duty
of directors to consider non-shareholder constituents). Nonetheless, David
accepts that law might be necessary to bring managers to take a longer-term
perspective, even as they take into account non-shareholder interests. See
generally Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32 (discussing the room
for law in socially-oriented corporate responsibility).
79. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 2 (“The law does
not mandate shareholder primacy.”).
80. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 984.
81. Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1034.
82. See id. at 1018 (“[M]anagement’s duty is to maximize the shareholders’
return on their investments in the corporation.”).
83. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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their stock.”84 That is, Lyman decidedly sides with the “entity
conception” of the corporation in which all corporate constituents
have a claim to fair treatment and against the “aggregate theory”
of the corporation in which only shareholders deserve this
treatment.85
How does my offshoring story play out for our two corporate
moralists—at least with respect to the fairness vector? David
would seem to be focused on whether and how the interests of
non-shareholders (principally workers) would impact the
long-term financial interests of shareholders.86 That is, David
would seem to consider and gauge the interests of the workers in
my story, both domestic and foreign, according to their impact on
enlightened shareholders. Or, maybe not. David’s thoughts on
how corporate managers might be pressured to consider
non-shareholder interests could well simply reflect a real politik
stance that, because re-jiggering the legal corporate governance
landscape is unlikely, the next best hope is that managers will
respond to “enlightened” shareholder and market pressures.87
That is, David admits that optimal “socially responsible behavior”
in the corporation may have to be legally coerced.88
Lyman, on the other hand, would not seem to weigh
shareholder interests in his moral deliberations.89 Whether the
company keeps its manufacturing processes in the United States
or moves them abroad, shareholders would seem to be the least of
Lyman’s concerns. What is unclear, though, is how Lyman would
resolve inter-constituency conflicts. His writings pit shareholders
84. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 984–85
(citing Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150, 1154).
85. Id. at 985
86. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing
how ESV is a long-term approach and that it “rejects a sole focus on shareholder
interests and instead embraces a broader approach that includes the
corporation's other stakeholders as well”).
87. See id. at 39 (noting this version of ESV is market-driven).
88. See id. at 6 (“[C]ritics of transnational corporations should not expect
that a commitment to shareholder value—even if enlightened—will necessarily
generate the measure of socially responsible behavior that they believe to be
appropriate.”).
89. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 422 (“The issue of the
best interests of the corporation is a matter of concern only for directors.”).
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against non-shareholder constituencies, but do not recognize that
when shareholders are removed from the moral calculus, the
conflicts among non-shareholders can be just as real. Corporate
moral discourse is a messy affair, and it is understandable that
those who engage in it have not specified precisely how
multi-dimensional decision-making works.
C. Freedom/Coercion
Lyman and David push back against the motivated
reasoning of the Law and Economics movement that celebrates
the freedom afforded corporate management under the business
judgment rule (BJR).90 But they do so for different reasons.
David would leave intact the BJR, but have its capacious
boundaries include decisions that “sacrifice short-term
shareholder profits for the sake of
nonshareholder
considerations . . . by reference to the corporation’s long-run
well-being.”91 David seems to recognize the lack of normative
limits on the discretion exercised by directors, accepting a view
that “director primacy” may accurately describe the operation of
corporate decision-making.92 As he points out, “managerial
discretion, broadly if not entirely shielded from shareholder
oversight, is arguably the foundation of Delaware corporate
law.”93
Lyman, on the other hand, has argued for a rethinking of
judicial oversight of corporate decisions, urging a shift from the
current perspective of directorial discretion under the BJR (a
nearly quintessential “freedom” moral vector) to one that begins

90. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 8 (noting that
under the BJR, “the judiciary will not second-guess strategic and operational
decisions as long as they are based on sufficient information, not subject to
conflict of interest, and made in good faith”).
91. Id. at 8.
92. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1017 (“In today’s
corporate law discourse, the ‘shareholder protection’ version of shareholder
primacy resonates with Professor Stephen Bainbridge's ‘director primacy’ theory
of corporate law.”).
93. Id. at 1023.
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with questions of duty (a decidedly “loyalty” moral vector).94 As
Lyman has said, “fiduciary duties should be made more
prominent and the BJR should be dramatically deemphasized.”95
Lyman asserts that the reluctance to find directors have breached
duties, as preached by the BJR, should be limited to boardroom
decisions and not extended to decisions or actions by officers and
controlling shareholders.96 He points out, “the business judgment
rule is well established as a mainstay doctrine in Delaware only
with respect to corporate directors, not with respect to officers or
controlling shareholders.”97
David recaps the history of the “law and economics” love
affair with “shareholder primacy.” It is curious, though, that a
moral tribe (the Chicago School) that so celebrates freedom would
seek to enslave corporate managers to shareholder masters. Why
the yoke of “shareholder primacy”? Although David does not
explicitly answer the question, the answer may well be that the
rhetoric of shareholder primacy is itself a smoke screen. Knowing
that neither law nor practice (nor political realities) would make
corporate managers subservient to shareholders, the Chicago
School advances a secret agenda of managerial empowerment by
arguing for the appearances of managerial agency.98
As told by David, there was no great rising up against
managerial overreaching, no march on Dover or D.C. to
unshackle shareholders from their managerialist masters, no
protest movement when the takeover tools of the 1980s were
essentially dulled and de-fanged by a variety of legal and extralegal forces that left managers as powerful as ever. In David’s
words, “corporate law has not evolved in ways that empower
shareholders to exercise direct control over those on whom they
are dependent for their financial returns.”99 Shareholders are left

94. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 424–25 (asserting that
Delaware’s “pride of place” for BJR should be replaced by showcasing fiduciary
duties).
95. Id. at 405.
96. Id. at 410.
97. Id.
98. See generally Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32.
99. Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1034.
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with an activism that operates at the fringes of the enormous
repository of discretion left to corporate managers.
David also explores whether international norms might
compel a corporate board to choose a non-shareholder approach to
protect human rights. While he concludes that hard international
law (treaties and customary norms) do not specify human rights
and environmental obligations applicable to transnational
corporations, he does find an emerging soft law governing
activities of transnational companies.100 He points to the United
Nations Global Compact, which specifies ten principles of
“corporate citizenship in the world economy” in the areas of
human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption.101
Although participation is voluntary, some 5,200 companies in 130
countries have signed on and are obligated to prepare and
provide annual reports.102
That is, David sees soft norms as beginning to create coercive
pressures on corporate managers to consider basic human rights
in their decision-making—particularly in transnational
companies that aspire to “corporate global citizenship.”103 That is,
the tribal boundaries for transnational corporate managers are
being re-defined through the tribe’s own processes of
metamorphosis. It is a hopeful story that recognizes the limited
range of law and the much wider (and more powerful) range in
which moral values operate.
In addition, David imagines a “strategic” CSR in which the
claims for various stakeholders work in tandem with the profit
motives of shareholders, thus countering the “law and economics”
view of CSR as imposing losses on shareholders in a zero-sum
game.104

100. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 84–85 (pointing
to United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically
calls on private groups, thus corporations, to protect basic human rights).
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 13–14 (noting how such norms may be incorporated in
companies’ voluntary codes of conduct).
104. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 533–35 (describing
“strategic” versus “philanthropic” CSR).
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Lyman, unlike David, is more concerned with hard norms
and the rhetorical power of the BJR to soften judicial resolve to
oversee the exercise of managerial discretion on behalf of the
“corporation.” For example, in discussing the waivability of
fiduciary duties, Lyman is unbending and inveterate in defending
the force of duties in business organizations.105 In fact, it is
remarkable how Justice Cardozo’s words resonate and continue
their life in Lyman’s views on corporate duties:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty . . . .106

In discussing the ability of participants in a business to
waive the sanctity of their relationship in the name of contractual
freedom, Lyman articulates the arguments for waivers. Arguably,
he points out, they would create “greater certainty and
determinacy in intra-firm relations” and allow investors to bear
the “greater risk from broad waivers for other perceived
benefits”—safeguarded against “egregious misconduct” by
managers’ desire to protect their reputations and their need to
access capital markets.107 But these are the arguments of those
who celebrate the freedom granted directors under the BJR, and
Lyman is skeptical. There are “well-recognized shortcomings with
much ex ante bargaining” and courts “should continue to worry
about the abuse of managerial discretion.”108 Moreover, waivers
(freedom) may not be for investors alone to give: The business
entity (the corporation) is pluralistic.109

105. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 721 (stating that
waiver statutes are necessary to waive contractual duties, but not sufficient to
establish appropriateness of the waiver).
106. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
107. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 721.
108. Id. at 722.
109. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 438 (“[L]aw rightly
adopts an enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate purpose . . . .”).
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Lyman elevates corporate duties to a central role in corporate
law and corporate governance, with the focus of corporate law not
on managerial “freedom” but on managerial “duties.”110 Lyman
proposes a fundamental rethinking of the BJR and its analytical
preeminence, arguing for making fiduciary duties “more
prominent” and the BJR “dramatically deemphasized.”111
So how would my story resonate to David and Lyman—under
the influence of the “freedom” vector? David would make clear
that the board has the freedom to choose “employment policies
that seem costly in the short term” if they could be justified over
a longer term.112 That is, the board would not be bound to choose
to move the company’s manufacturing offshore. David intimates
that the directors, moved by new soft norms, might decide to have
the company stay in the United States and perhaps undertake
costly worker-protection measures or to move only after an
alternative manufacturing process were identified. Perhaps,
David would suggest, the board would be moved to enhance
goodwill among consumers or perhaps feel compelled to respond
to pressure from sustainable, responsible, impact (SRI)
shareholders. In the end, while David goes to lengths to assert
the board is not compelled to pursue short-term shareholder
interests, he does not give a full account of the soft norms that
might compel the moral decisions faced by directors.
Lyman paints a darker portrait of the management soul. He
disdains the judicial attitude that corporate managers have an
inherent freedom to choose the corporation’s trajectory.113
110. See id. at 405 (“[I]t is suggested that fiduciary duties should be made
more prominent and the business judgment rule should be dramatically
deemphasized.”).
111. Id.; see also Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34,
at 977 n.12 (arguing that corporate managers do not only owe a duty to their
stockholders to make a profit but should advance a range of broader “corporate”
interests (citing E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932))).
112. David Millon, Human Rights and Delaware Corporate Law, 25 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 173, 179 (2012).
113. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 405 (“For directors, those
[policy] rationales do not apply in the loyalty setting, and in the care setting,
can be achieved by recalling simply that there is no substance to judicial review
in that context.”).
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Instead, he argues for a fundamental rethinking of the BJR and
its soporific incantations that dissolve the sense of duty that he
sees as central to the pluralism that defines the corporation and
its purpose.114 Thus, Lyman would address the offshoring
question by reference to the corporate purpose, a purpose to
which the corporate directors are duty-bound to advance. In the
end, the offshoring story lacks important details, and Lyman’s
approach might well be one of process. The corporate directors
would be compelled to dig more deeply into the questions of
effects on the American (and the Ruranesia) workers, their
families and communities. Lyman points out that “American
society” has become “somewhat disenchanted with the corporate
sector,” and “societal expectations of the private sector are
shifting.”115 Perhaps, the corporate board would also be compelled
to consider the effects of the offshoring decision on the business’s
overall carbon footprint. After all, Lyman is decidedly nonlibertarian.
D. Loyalty/Betrayal
David and Lyman have a nuanced difference in their views
on the question to whom corporate managers owe their
allegiance. David accepts, at least for the sake of argument, that
shareholders have “priority” and thus does not urge a pluralistic
model in which shareholders and other stakeholders have
comparable claims on corporate outcomes. Lyman, however,
advocates for a pluralism of interests, in which corporate
directors owe their loyalty to the “corporation” and must put
aside their own personal views for the collective good.
Thus, David seeks to broaden the dimensions that corporate
managers should consider, but within the framework of long-term
shareholder interests. He asserts that corporate managers are
not required by state corporate law (particularly the law of
Delaware) to accept shareholder primacy. Instead, corporate
114. See id. at 438 (asserting that “the deference of the business judgment
rule becomes a key mechanism for creating the necessary slack between law’s
agnosticism about corporate purpose and actual governance conduct”).
115. Id.
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managers should see themselves as bound to consider impacts on
the “corporation.”116 Likewise, but even more, Lyman questions
whether directors should hold shareholders in sacred worship,
decrying that “boards of public companies . . . seem far more
receptive to shareholder concerns than was true for much of the
twentieth century.”117 For Lyman, the implication is that this
fawning over shareholders is somehow disloyal, that directors
should have other objects of their loyalty (putting other interests
ahead of their own).
David sees misplaced loyalty in the corporation, with stockbased compensation and a corporate culture of “shareholder
loyalty,” inexorably pushing managers to focus on short-term
shareholder value.118 He decries the “radical shareholder
primacy” thesis that enforces, legally and in practice, a view that
managers owe undivided loyalty to shareholders and the
maximization of their financial wealth.119 Further, David points
out that pressures from institutional shareholders (now
collectivized by Institutional Shareholder Services) have led
corporate boards to dismantle poison pills and staggered boards,
giving shareholders and their demands for short-term results
even more salience in the boardroom.120
Lyman carries forward his views on the centrality of “duty”
in the corporation (particularly selfless loyalty to the corporation)
in his views of waiver of fiduciary duties. Although writing
mostly about waivers in non-corporate settings, Lyman is quick
116. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 72 (stating that
fiduciary duties run to corporation and identifying relevant consideration to
include impact on non-shareholder constituencies including “creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally”).
117. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 986.
118. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 77–79
(concluding that equity-based pay rewards short-term results rather than
longer-term performance and management culture assume that primary loyalty
should be to shareholders).
119. See Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1018–19
(“[M]anagement’s job is to act on behalf of shareholders, using its managerial
authority to advance their interests . . . . [And the] primary role of corporate law
is to enhance management’s accountability to the shareholders.”).
120. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 78 (describing
events as of 2010, before the congressional mandate of say-on-pay, which
predictably would further exacerbate shareholder pressures).
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to state he finds such waivers “objectionable.”121 He further
argues that the Delaware constitution prohibits corporate
statutes that would permit Delaware judges to uphold private
waiver of fiduciary duties.122 The basis for this constitutional
objection is key to understanding the vaunted place that duty
holds for Lyman in corporate law. As he explains, the business
bar and judiciary “forget that equity originates outside law and
does not readily yield to law’s strictures.”123 That is, duty is
inherent in the business (especially, the corporate) form whose
legal being rests on the foundation of equity jurisdiction.
If fiduciary duty and equity are inseparable, as they are for
Lyman, the question becomes toward what end. According to
Aristotle, equity “must correct the possible injustice resulting
from the categorical.”124 The injustices that Lyman imagines are
steeped in moral discourse: the disloyalty of directors who
advance a shareholders’ meeting date to frustrate a voting
insurgency; the directors who, after accepting a position of trust,
are grossly negligent in failing to supervise corporate affairs.125
Ultimately the validity of contractual waivers depends on a
judicial (equitable) assessment of “the degree of moral and
commercial repugnance of the [challenged] managerial behavior”
where “the overall state of business morality [is] an important
and legitimate social concern.”126
So how does the moral value of loyalty play out in the
resolution of the offshoring decision in my story? For David, there
is less of a sense of the importance of the loyalty that managers
owe to long-term corporate interests. This is not surprising. The
121. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 702 (“[T]he author
believes that permitting wholesale waiver of fiduciary duties is objectionable
and bad policy.”).
122. See id. (“[T]here is substantial doubt as to whether fiduciary duties in
unincorporated business associations formed under Delaware law can, by
private agreement, be waived at all.”).
123. Id. at 708.
124. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 141 (Martin Ostwald trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1962).
125. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 710–13 (citing Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) and Charitable Corp. v.
Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742)).
126. Id. at 719–20.
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soul of a progressive is less concerned about loyalty (with its
overtones of order and sanctity) than about compassion and
fairness. David does not seem to experience the visceral betrayal
when managers look out for their own short-term interests,
compared to feelings that Lyman has when managers are disloyal
to the corporate purpose. Lyman, true to his conservative matrix,
calls on a return to deep-seated (traditional) notions from equity
that call on directors to be selfless. How this selflessness should
be expressed in an offshoring decision is, again, hard to say. For
David, it might well be that the subtexts of human rights in the
workplace and environmental harm (such as runoffs from the
toxic chemicals used in the manufacturing process) guide his
judgment. For Lyman, loyalty to the corporation might well be
perceived as loyalty to the existing order—that is, the American
workers and society for which the corporation operates.
E. Order and Obedience/Chaos
David and Lyman have markedly different views of the way
in which corporate order exists and might evolve. For David,
management culture plays an important (if not critical) role in
molding the moral decisions of corporate decision makers—
perhaps even more important than law.127 While recognizing a
place for law, David seems to see corporate evolution as
happening from internal, extra-legal forces.128 For Lyman, on the
other hand, the framing construct for his propounded moral
matrices is corporate law. Lyman shows an abiding faith in the
“rule of law” (or perhaps “rule of equity”) and its analytical
purity: If we can just make persuasive arguments, the law will

127. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 78–80
(speculating how sustainability values being adopted by transnational
companies might infuse US corporate culture).
128. See id. at 79–80 (pointing to Section 172 of the U.K. Companies Act of
2006, which requires directors to promote interests of the corporation for the
benefit of shareholders, but with regard for long-term consequences, employee
interests, relations with suppliers and customers, and impacts on the
community and environment).
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follow.129 For Lyman, better logic equals—or, at least, eventually
will equal—better law and better outcomes.
David perceives that a move from the shareholder-centric
corporation to one that pays “heightened attention to human
rights and environmental considerations” will happen because of
the potential costs to the corporation of disregarding these
non-shareholder factors.130 That is, just as the corporation seeks
to gauge and control the financial, litigation, and reputational
risks to shareholder value, David imagines that similar costbenefit exigencies will lead to a more pluralistic corporation.131
This, perhaps in a leap of hope for David, will be because
enlightened shareholders demand such a result.
In fact, David sees an emerging “new corporate order” that
arises from a redefined relationship between institutional
shareholders and corporate management in which such
shareholders bind together to “incorporate [environmental, social,
and governance] ESG issues into investment analysis and
decision-making processes . . . [and to] be active owners and
incorporate ESG issues into ownership policies and practices.”132
Since Millon predicted this new order, there has been (as
described before) a perceptible change in the avowed ESG focus of
many U.S. public companies.133 Whether this is indeed a move
toward a new and accountable order is still unclear. After all,
129. For example, Lyman observes as an article of faith: “Ultimately, judges
must express the resolution of fundamental issues in doctrinal terms, their
lingua franca.” Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 408. He cites to
viewpoints of various legal scholars, but does not explain why judges must
explain how their decisions arise from doctrine. Id. Perhaps resorting to doctrine
is an accepted modality of the legal culture that judges inhabit. They are bound
by accepted norms, including a common language. A decision by a highest court
that simply stated, “We affirm [or] reverse [or] remand, because we just feel that
way,” would face academic finger-wagging and snickering. But others might
view such a pithy judicial opinion as a breath of honesty.
130. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 80.
131. See id. at 81–84 (discussing the importance of corporate sensitivity to
liability and reputational risk).
132. See id. at 84–85 (describing United Nations Principles for Responsible
Investment, a set of six core principles agreed to by twenty institutional
shareholders from twelve countries through the coordination of the U.N.
Secretary-General).
133. Id.
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predictions of a new “CSR corporation” have been afoot for nearly
two decades.134 And real corporate engagement has been spotty.
For example, an SEC guidance in 2010 urging greater corporate
disclosure of the various regulatory, market, and operational
risks of climate change fell mostly on deaf ears.135 But, if a new
CSR is beginning to coalesce, it could transform corporate
culture.
Lyman, on the other hand, sees a new corporate order arising
from law. Just as Louis Brandeis grieved the dissolution of
regulatory order in the late Nineteenth Century136—in a spiraling
race of laxity that erased the limits on amount of capital,
specifications of duration of the corporation, prohibitions on
holding of stock in other corporations, and shareholder veto
powers,137 Lyman imagines a return to “the good old days.” He
sees some of this coming from managerial “professional
introspection” and engagement within the larger corporate
community, but especially from the heretofore-BJR-enamored
“Delaware bench” who he urges to “rethink and possibly remold
prior rulings, in the light of experience.”138
In this vein, Lyman also imagines not only a diminishment of
the BJR, but also a new order of duties within the corporation.
134. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 85 (citing Claire
Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (2002)).
135. See Alan R. Palmiter, Climate Change Disclosure: A Failed SEC
Mandate, SSRN (Aug. 3, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2639181 (last visited
Apr. 18, 2017) (“In 2010 the SEC issued an interpretive guidance calling on
public companies to take seriously their disclosure responsibilities with respect
to climate risk . . . Then it all unraveled.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
136. See TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 1880–1990 191–95 (describing Brandeis’ dissents in postwar deregulation cases); see also, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421, 429 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns about the Court
departing from established practice in dismissing regulation cases).
137. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975
(“[C]orporate law itself developed in such a way as to loosen, not tighten, most
constraints on those who govern public corporations.”).
138. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 408–09 (admonishing
“judges, as a lawmaking mechanism, to stand between the categorical edicts of a
legislative/regulatory state and pure, unconstrained, private ordering”).
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Specifically, he seeks to revive the idea of “public directors”
who—in addition to being selected by non-shareholder
constituencies—would owe duties to the corporation.139 Thus,
these directors (even though having the ostensible purpose to
represent non-shareholder interests and viewpoints) would be
duty-bound to consider the “corporation” as a totality.
Lyman, in this sense, is anti-order. He would do away with
the monism of shareholder profit maximization. He states his
worry that “Delaware law might be interpreted as imposing an
undesirable monism of corporate purpose at a time when, in
corporate law as elsewhere, institutional pluralism should be
encouraged.”140 Monism is well-structured; its elegance
commands respect; it is conservative. If a board chooses to erect
an antitakeover barrier that dilutes shareholder value and
primacy—as happened in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark,141 where the directors sought to preserve the control
structure thus to preserve the company’s purpose to create a
“community” of those using the firm’s services—monism offers a
clear answer.142 In the case, directors sought to undo the monistic
purpose of the corporation.
Consistent with his view that law should (or does) recognize
a pluralistic corporate purpose, Lyman asserts that the legal
corporate order resolves the question whether corporate rights
and duties are waivable. The notion of waiver of corporate duties,
first unleashed by the “law and economics” movement that reimagined the corporation as contract, is at odds with Lyman’s
view of the law-bound order of the corporation.143 Not only finding
such waivers to be “bad sportsmanship,” Lyman lays out a
well-researched argument that whatever waiver authorizations
139. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 977–
78 (describing proposals for revamped composition of boards of directors).
140. Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 409–10.
141. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
142. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 439 (explaining that
Craigslist “operates its business as a community service”).
143. See Larry E. Ribstein, Writing About and Teaching Corporate Law:
Reflections on Corporate Law and Economic Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 509, 523
(1991) (discussing essays on the proposition of the corporation as a contract and
that the corporation “is a set of contractual relationships”).
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the state’s legislature might have enacted are unenforceable in
Delaware courts as a matter of Delaware constitutional law.144
Although he makes this point primarily in the context of
non-corporate forms, where Delaware judges and courts have
exhibited a broad willingness to accept contractual waivers of
fiduciary duties,145 the essential point that Lyman makes is that
corporate fiduciary duties cannot be “curtailed or negated.”146
So how would the moral orders imagined by David and
Lyman help resolve the story of the offshoring corporation? David
would begin by denying the answer propounded by “radical
shareholder primacy”—that the offshoring decision should be
based on a short-term, cost-benefit analysis focused on
shareholder profits.147 But David is left floundering about how to
measure longer-term effects and on whom. As argued by some, a
corporation whose purpose is to advance the interests of multiple
constituents is a corporation whose order comes to turn on the
caprice of managers.148 But perhaps this is the new corporate
order, and it will have to sort out what a pluralistic corporation
means.149 Lyman, even more than David, instinctively sees the
144. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 701–05
(analogizing corporate rules to the rules of golf, which the players are not
permitted to waive).
145. See id. at 720 (comparing corporate and non-corporate law in
Delaware).
146. See id. at 705 (explaining that Delaware’s exculpation statute only
permits reduction or elimination of monetary damages for breaches of the duty
of care, but not alteration of the duty itself).
147. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1013–14 (describing
“radical shareholder primacy” as the version of shareholder primacy theory
whose key corporate law focus is to “minimize agency costs so as to maximize
shareholder wealth”).
148. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 24, 31–36 (1991) (criticizing
non-shareholder constituency statutes for requiring “corporate agents to serve
so many masters—employees, communities, bondholders, customers,
suppliers—that the costs of dual fiduciary duties in terms of confusion and
misunderstanding
by
courts
and litigants
vastly
outweigh any
potential benefits”).
149. See id. at 42–43 (referencing a pluralist understanding of governmental
process such that local communities mobilize to politically oppose corporate
harms, but without describing a pluralistic corporation).
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corporation as pluralistic.150 But why this is so is unclear. Lyman
would see the directors as compelled to consider the interests of
workers, presumably at home and abroad.151 And their
communities would also have some weight on the scales. Perhaps
by bringing new directors to the board, the corporate culture
would shift as it sought to incorporate a wider set of moral
matrices beyond the order imposed by shareholder wealth
maximization.152
F. Sacred/Sacrilege
David and Lyman have different views on the ultimate
purpose of the corporation—that is, what corporate governance
would hold as sacred. David’s view seems much more
instrumental, perhaps borrowing from the instrumental (and
thus amoral) constructs prevalent in the corporate governance
literature.153 Lyman, on the other hand, sees the corporation as
infused by its nature with a public, social, and thus sacred
purpose.154
David, while urging a more other-thinking corporation,
places such a corporation in a corporate culture in which he
recognizes that financial self-interest drives all action.155 David’s
150. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 438 (favoring the law’s
“enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate purpose” because of the need to
hold directors and managers “accountable for their conduct”).
151. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 978
(noting that a reform effort focused on worker representation on the board has
failed to take root in the United States).
152. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 719–20
(reminding scholars that the “overall state of business morality” is an
“important and legitimate societal concern”).
153. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 96–97
(concluding that bottom line financial concerns do and will continue to drive
corporate management and corporate social responsibility).
154. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 451 (concluding that the
money-maximizing purpose neglects “broader social expectations of business
conduct in the modern world”).
155. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (accepting the general
primacy of profit maximization efforts in corporate management in the current
and prospective corporate legal landscape).
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vision of a corporation guided by enlightened shareholders is
ultimately “driven” by financial self-interest, which because of
market and reputational pressures acts as a force to expand
attention to human rights, environmental, and other CSR
values.156 For David, at least in his description of the means and
the end of the corporation, money remains the corporation’s
sacred purpose.157
Lyman, however, seems to be animated by a vision of the
modern corporation espoused by Adolf Berle.158 Pointing to the
analysis of Professors Bratton and Wachter, Lyman identifies
that Berle did not advocate shareholder empowerment as an end,
but rather as a means.159 “His belief [was] that a public
corporation should broadly serve societal goals, since powerful
institutional investors simply represent one set of oligarchs
replacing another—corporate managers.”160 For Lyman, the
proper end is a re-purposed corporation, not one that merely
chooses to pursue its wealth-maximizing purpose in a more
inclusive, full-hearted way.161
Lyman decries that the modern corporation’s purposes have
been usurped and defiled:
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century,
unfolding developments in the law of corporate governance—
state and federal—still take no direct heed of broad corporate
responsibility concerns in regular business corporations

156. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 39–40
(discussing the reputational harm that would result from inattention to these
considerations).
157. See id. at 46 (noting the reputational cost concerns that play a role in
the ultimate cost-benefit considerations of corporate management).
158. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 974
(citing ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1932) (referencing the grip Berle’s contributions have had
on corporate law)).
159. See id. at 987 (noting that “shareholder empowerment was not one of
the political outcomes envisioned” by Berle).
160. Id. at 987.
161. See id. at 989 (finding that the “historical corporate responsibility
approach of focusing solely on director-manager volunteerism or external legal
regulation of the corporation needs rethinking”).
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because corporate governance remains a closed system of just
three groups—investors, directors, and managers.162

Lyman, instead, admires the earlier voices that imagined
corporate structures that included a broader set of concerns.163
Further, Lyman decries that Delaware has strayed from a
pluralistic vision of the corporation, which he sees as its
animating purpose.164 As to corporate purpose, Lyman calls on
“Delaware law [to] permit a pluralistic approach in the for-profit
corporate sector” and away from “a strict shareholder primacy
focus in the 2010 eBay decision.”165 Thus, Lyman seeks a new
corporate order—statutory, to be sure—that empowers the
modern corporation to pursue purposes other than shareholdercentric monistic purposes.166
How would David’s and Lyman’s views on the animating
purpose of the corporation—its sacred nature—guide them in
resolving my offshoring story? David would seem to believe the
corporation’s decision should be decided by financial self-interest,
informed by “social responsibility” factors that seep into the
financial cost-benefit calculus by virtue of non-corporate legal
risks, consumer pressures, and public shaming.167 That is,
corporate decision makers might do good, but only to the extent
they feel compelled to do well. Capitalism’s worship of profits,
which David seems to adopt for the sake of argument, may
occupy a sacred place in the corporation.168
Lyman, however, sees a corporation—and thus its
decision-making culture—as more defined by legal constraints
162. Id. at 988.
163. See id. at 977 (describing a 1959 essay by Abram Chayes calling on
non-investor groups as having a greater say in corporate decisions as “truly
innovative, fairly vague”).
164. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 405 (introducing his
argument that Delaware law should permit a pluralistic approach in the forprofit corporate sector).
165. Id. at 405.
166. See id. at 409, 448–49 (proposing various legislative solutions).
167. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 93 (discussing
the extra-legal pressures imposed upon corporations by private actors that
“reshape management attitudes and behavior”).
168. See id. at 95 (reiterating the fact that “[a]ll businesses must earn
profits in order to survive and prosper”).
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and compulsion.169 He sees the corporation as being wayward.
The typical publicly-traded corporation no longer holds sacred
values of selfless commitment to the well-being of others.170
Instead, Lyman concludes that a commitment to others is today
expressed in extra-corporate norms, such as environmental law
or workplace safety regulation.171 Within the corporation he does
not perceive selflessness or even mechanisms that might lead to
this. In short, Lyman might well react to the offshoring story by
decrying the absence of legal rules against offshoring jobs in the
United States or the failure of legal norms to protect Ruranesia
workers.
IV. Conclusion
The
pluralistic
corporation—like
sustainability—is
multi-faceted.172 Move one part and another moves, often in
unexpected ways. In the end, the law of corporate governance
gives corporate decision makers capacious room to balance
(consciously and unconsciously) the moving parts of nearly every
business decision.173 The interesting questions of corporate
governance are how business decisions happen, and perhaps even
more interesting how decision-making might be made to evolve.
Attempts at legal reform would seem bound to fail. For
example, Lyman points out that “other constituency” statutes—
which call on corporate directors to take into account the
interests of constituencies beyond those of short-term
169. See supra note 144, at 702 (disputing the ability to contractually waive
fiduciary duties under Delaware law).
170. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975
(noting the corporation’s “rise in commercial significance” and the now
“unsustainable neglect of corporate responsibility”).
171. See id. at 976 (determining that corporate law regulation’s decline has
led to external regulations designed to protect “vulnerable constituencies such
as consumers, employees, and the natural environment”).
172. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 436 (describing the
pluralistic approach whereby purposes are pursued by “combining financial
pursuits with ‘socially responsible’ objectives”).
173. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 524 (remarking on
the “main challenge” to balance “potentially conflicting interests implicated by
business decisions”).
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shareholders—have been a resounding failure.174 In Lyman’s
words, “these laws [adopted in nearly thirty jurisdictions] appear
to have had little visible and enduring impact on corporate
governance.”175
Instead, like our political constitutional structure, the most
powerful force moving the body politic of the modern corporation
is “soft law,” that body of norms that are nearly unperceived, but
that guide attitudes, behavior and decisions as surely as
gravity.176 The legal “bite” of positive law—what most corporate
law academics seem to mean when referring to corporate
governance—may be far less affective than the “evolving
normative expectations as to what responsible corporate conduct
should look like in the twenty-first century.”177 That is, corporate
governance is really a set of moral matrices embedded in the
process of corporate decision-making.178
So if corporate governance reform is to embrace a larger
social consciousness, it will not happen with the flourish of a
legislative pen or the incantations made in a judicial opinion
(even by a court of equity), but rather from a shift in moral
perspective. This is a great lesson of moral psychology.179 We are
174. For the description of statutes as expressly authorizing board of
directors to consider non-shareholder interests, including employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, and local communities see Johnson, Law and Corporate
Responsibility, supra note 34, at 979 (listing these statutes); Millon, Enlightened
Shareholder, supra note 32, at 73–74 (same).
175. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 980; see
also Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 9 (counting forty-one
jurisdictions with a constituency or stakeholder statute). See generally Millon,
Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 30; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 579 (1992).
176. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 981
(describing “soft law” as non-binding initiatives lacking the legal ‘bite’ of positive
law); see also Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 75 (finding
that “‘soft law’ developments illustrate movement towards a “set of substantive
standards governing the activities of transnational companies”).
177. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 981.
178. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 429 (referencing “moral
discourse” and the possibility of “ex ante moral admonition” leading to more
honest managerial conduct).
179. See id. at 429 (noting the contributions of behavioral psychology to
these moral concepts).
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not persuaded to change our moral decision making by others’
arguments (or motivated reasoning). Instead, moral evolution
happens when we sense that our “tribal culture” is moving
toward a new paradigm.180 And we are bound to move with it.
The term “thought leaders” captures this idea.181 That is,
thought leaders are those persons embedded within our tribal
culture who are capable of seeing beyond the boundaries that
define and protect us.182 They can be the ones (perhaps the only
ones) to provide new feedback loops. We don’t perceive the
change; just as individual fish move in a school that itself moves
like a single organism responding to currents, food sources, and
threats, we move with the flow of our culture. In Haidt’s words,
we first bind ourselves to a moral matrix and then become blind
to others’ moral matrices.183
It is no surprise, according to Lyman, that “genuine reform of
the deep decision-making architecture of corporate governance”
has received “little innovative thinking”—or that it has gone
“nowhere.”184 Observers of corporate governance have been
chasing up the wrong tree. Understanding the nature of corporate
decision-making—and thus ways it might evolve or be reformed—
depends not on formulating well-constructed arguments for
corporate decision-makers to use as a new roadmap to more
inclusiveness or even to impose new legal norms that seek to
180. See generally JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND
GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM (2014) (discussing evolution, culture, and
personal experience as a launching pad for progressive, forward-thinking).
181. See Britton Manasco, If You’re Not a Thought Leader You Won’t
Survive, 10-3 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFF. 7 (2010) (identifying
thought leaders as those with great potential for becoming “trusted
authorities”).
182. See id. (describing three factors that make thought leadership
important to lawyers and professional business firms in particular).
183. See generally HAIDT, supra note 2; Jonathan Haidt & Jesse
Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions
that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 98 (2007) (“Morality binds
and blinds. It binds us into ideological teams that fight each other as though the
fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us to the
fact that each team is composed of good people who have something important
to say.”).
184. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 976
(discussing the innovation vacuum in this area).
THE
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discombobulate existing modalities. It depends on reshaping the
moral matrix in the boardroom—a major paradigm shift.
A shift in paradigm is no small matter. As Lyman points out,
even though “many managers” may disagree with the narrow
focus on investor well-being, they find it “futile (and against
self-interest) to resist a share-maximizing strategy pushed by a
determined group of activists.”185 But times are changing. For
example, the hedge-fund-led shareholder activism that has
dominated the academic and policy discourse for the last couple
decades is beginning to wane.186 Hedge funds are out of favor, as
their collective promise to beat the market has proved hollow.187
And there is a rise in socially-responsible investing—a broad and
amorphous concept—that seems to be placing remarkable new
pressures on corporate managers to show an “environmental,
social, governance” (ESG) consciousness.188
185.
186.

Id. at 986.
See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES
ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 163–81 (5th ed. 2016) (discussing the
rise of institutional investor power in the publicly-held business sector and, in
particular, the proliferation and empowerment of hedge funds).
187. See Jen Wieczner, Why Big Investors Are Finally Pulling Their Money
Out of Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, (Mar. 2 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/
03/02/hedge-fund-investors-withdraw-returns/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017)
(noting the generally lackluster returns for hedge fund investors) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also JEFF C. HOOKE & JOHN WALTERS,
THE MD. PUB. POLICY INST., MARYLAND POLICY REPORT: WALL STREET FEES AND
INVESTMENT RETURNS FOR 33 STATE PENSION FUNDS 1–2 (2015)
https://www.mdpolicy.org/docLib/20150804_MarylandPolicyReport201505.pdf
(finding that state pension-fund investments in private equity funds and hedge
funds under performed relevant benchmark returns).
188. Two recent reports by the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible
Investing found that “sustainable, responsible, impact” (SRI) investing grew by
76% from 2012 to 2014 and another 33% from 2014 to 2016, with a fourfold
increase in assets under management that takes into account environmental,
social and governance (ESG) issues. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE
INV., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS
(11th ed. 2016), http://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary
(1).pdf [hereinafter 2016 REPORT]; FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE INV.,
REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS (10th
ed.
2014)
http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 REPORT]. From 1995 to 2014, SRI assets in the United States
grew tenfold from $0.6 trillion to $6.2 trillion, 2014 REPORT, and then to $8.7
trillion in 2016, representing today about 20% of all U.S. financial assets under
professional management, 2016 REPORT.
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Thus, Lyman’s concern that “calls for broadly responsible
conduct” would resonate more with private companies rather
than companies with publicly traded securities may have
reversed its polarity in the last few years.189 The pressures on
managers of public companies to show ESG performance may
now be greater than the pressures on managers of private
companies to follow their conscience.190 In fact, companies owned
by private equity firms would seem to have even more pressures
to maximize share returns.
We in the legal academy—and the corporate legal academy—
have become less relevant to those who make corporate law. And
corporate law has become less relevant to those who make
corporate decisions. Consider, as does Lyman, the story of Rule
14a-8.191 It was originally promulgated by the SEC to specify a
mechanism for shareholders in public companies to vote on
proposals by fellow shareholders on matters of mutual interest.192
An early case confirmed the rule’s purpose to give shareholders a
voice in matters of shareholder-centric corporate governance—in
the case, to require a shareholder vote on the company’s auditing
firm and procedures to amend the company’s bylaws.193 But then,
in the 1970s, the rule came to be used as a tool to put matters of
corporate social responsibility before shareholders and
management.194 But none of these CSR proposals garnered
189. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 989
(arguing that this is so because private companies are not “subject to capital
market or shareholder voting pressures”).
190. See id. at 989 (“Perhaps, too, the corporate responsibility focus in the
public corporation will migrate (or broaden) to include calls for more fully
exploring—culturally and legally—the ‘social responsibility’ aspects of share
ownership.”).
191. See id. at 982–83 (referencing activism through a proposal to
shareholders at Dow Chemical invoking Rule 14a-8).
192. See Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84
HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1971) (“Rule 14a-8 grants to a shareholder the right
to have a proposal which he intends to present at a stockholders’ meeting
included by management in the corporate proxy materials.”).
193. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 513 (3d Cir. 1947)
(identifying the specific proposals desired for presentation to the shareholders
for action).
194. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982–
83 (describing the anti-Vietnam activism against Dow Chemical’s manufacture
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shareholder support, and they were seen by management and
most shareholders as an irritation.195 Then, in the 1990s, the rule
shifted back to being a corporate governance tool, with proposals
calling on director stock ownership, de-staggering of corporate
boards, and majority voting by shareholders regularly gaining
majority support.196
How we view the corporation and its purposes is a moral
question that we each resolve outside of our conscious attention—
and well beyond rational argumentation. The analysis,
formulations, and clever insights that we all engage in—and
much on display at the Symposium honoring David and Lyman—
are just ways for our tribe to bind together. If we are to change
others’ moral matrices and perhaps our own,197 it will be by
listening,
sympathizing,
reassuring,
being
exemplary,
explaining—best done over dinner and drinks. This was David
Hume’s great insight and approach to life.198 We are analogic,
instinctive, emotional beings. And we’re very fast at it.199
We leave the Holocene, the ten thousand years of stable
climate and abundant resources that gave humankind farming,
commerce, and modernity.200 And we enter the Anthropocene,
of napalm).
195. See id. at 983 (noting that the resolutions received “less than 3 percent
of the” stockholder votes).
196. See id. at 985 (citing Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998–1005 (2010) (describing the decline in staggered boards
and the rise in majority voting for directors)).
197. See generally HAIDT, supra note 2, at 219–366 (discussing the idea that
“[m]orality binds and blinds”).
198. See The School of Life, PHILOSOPHY—David Hume, YOUTUBE (Oct.
10,
2016)
(last
visited Apr.
6,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=HS52H_CqZLE (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (illustrating Hume’s
philosophy on human nature) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
199. See generally FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY
(2013) (describing how we make decisions, consciously and subconsciously, often
in milliseconds).
200. See Holocene Epoch, BBC NATURE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/nature/
history_of_the_earth/Holocene (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“The Holocene (or
Recent) is the current geological epoch which started some 11,500 years ago
when the glaciers began to retreat.”) (on file with The Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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with a destabilized climate, growing resource limits, and the
prospect of unprecedented adaptation.201 How we become
sustainable—that is, how we become more pluralistic in our
decision-making—is the great question of our time.202 My Essay
is a fumbling attempt to explain a possible path toward greater
pluralism and sustainability thinking in corporate governance.

201. See Simon L. Lewis & Mark A. Maslin, Defining the Anthropocene,
NATURE, Mar. 12, 2015, 171, at 171–78 (describing the Anthropocene as a
potentially new geological epoch dominated by humans).
202. See generally DAVID W. ORR, DANGEROUS YEARS: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE
LONG EMERGENCY, AND THE WAY FORWARD (2016) (asserting that our present
problems result from how we make decisions and take action together after
surveying our current climate crisis).

